Annex 3 Climate Impact Assessment

Future Bus Regulation Models

Summary of Assessment

1. The commissioned Bus Report and the Cabinet Recommendation resulting from it, do not focus on assessing how the proposed EP+ delivery model would contribute to achieve the climate and broader sustainability targets established in the Local Transport and Connectivity Plan (LTCP).

2. This CIA outlines the case for change, highlighting that current transport carbon emissions trends are deviating from LTCP targets. Rather than prescribing a particular bus delivery model, this CIA focuses on areas of improvement in the existing EP bus delivery model, that should be addressed in any future bus delivery model. In doing so this CIA highlights uneven distribution of risks and rewards in the existing EP model, that are hindering the achievement of LTCP climate targets. The EP+ proposed model seems to be an incremental change from the existing EP bus delivery model. Whether the EP+ proposal can address the areas of improvement and better distribution of risks and rewards highlighted in this CIA, depends on the feasibility of reaching the required agreements with bus operators within such framework. Given the existing good relation between Oxfordshire County Council (OCC) and bus operators, it is worth testing the limits of such EP+ proposal in the interim period before the bus delivery model may be revisited again as a result of Local Government Reorganisation and Devolution.

3. As part of supporting LAs decision to engage in alternative bus delivery models, best practices on EP+ models will be published by government later in the year and should be considered in the negotiation process for the OCC EP+ delivery model.

4. Any future negotiations with bus operators for an EP+ bus delivery model should focus on the challenges highlighted in this CIA :
    1) Reverse the existing trend in local transport greenhouse gas reductions deviating from LTCP target of achieving a net zero transport network by 2040 and
    2) Tackle the affordability challenge that remains an obstacle for further adoption of bus transport. Part of addressing this challenge depends on a revision of distribution of risks and rewards (point 5 below), focusing on translating value created in the partnership towards making fares more affordable.
    3) Better integration of OCC transport planning and infrastructure delivery with bus operation planning, particularly focusing on integrated transport systems, in preparation for the future publication of UK's Integrated National Transport Strategy.

5. The EP+ model will enhance OCC capabilities for improved ways of working in the future (e.g. access to detailed route patronage data and stronger involvement of Highways Team within EP). Officers should aim to negotiate and

test how an EP+ model can address the uneven distribution of risks and rewards in the existing EP partnership which are highlighted in this CIA namely:

a) innovation risk mitigated by central government,
b) de facto monopolies in dedicated routes,
c) value of public funded efficiencies not directed towards affordable fares.

This uneven distribution of risks and rewards may prevent the existing partnership from addressing the social and climate challenges detailed in this CIA.

6. A summary of CIA scoring is presented below (full detailed scoring can be found at the end of this Annex). This scoring is based on:

1) The recommendation to Cabinet to develop a proposal for an Enhanced Partnership Plus (EP+) model, which is based on the existing EP model.
2) uncertainties of EP+ outcomes which depend on bus operator negotiations which have not taken place yet, and
3) whether or not these may be sufficient to achieve LTCP climate targets.

It is recommended that this CIA is revisited and reviewed once EP+ conditions have been negotiated with bus operators and final agreements achieved.



Introduction

The purpose of the CIA is to understand how council's decisions may affect OCC capacity to achieve our climate targets. Climate change mitigation targets are within the multiple policies included in the Local Transport and Connectivity Plan, which highlights the strategic role of active travel and public transport in relation to their contribution to social, economic, environmental and climate action goals. In the case of climate action, OCC's targets are outlined in the Local Transport and Connectivity Plan, particularly the target to achieve a net zero transport network by 2040. Based on the Bus Report Analysis and further evidence collected (not included in the Bus report) in this Annex we aim to provide insights for supporting this decision process.

Public-private partnerships such as the existing bus partnership between OCC and bus operators are meant to deliver access to private sector capital, enhanced efficiency, innovation, risk sharing, improved service quality and long-term value for money.

According to the Bus Report, the partnership has achieved a strong network of commercial city services and inter-urban network; new and enhanced services, with greater geographical coverage (all communities with 500+ population now have a bus service); improved service quality through improved and real time information; and to some extent access to private sector capital. Nevertheless, the Bus Report itself highlights that it is difficult to determine the role of the EP model in these achievements and instead states that the availability of significant funding (particularly central government funding) has certainly been an instrumental factor along with the willingness of interested parties to work together regardless of any formal organisation. The Bus Report highlights that a partnership is meant to allow partners to keep each other to account via a legally binding EP Scheme. However, there appear to be no known instances where this mechanism has been used, and in practice, it may not serve the partnership's best interests to do so. Guidance on best practices on EP bus delivery models will be published later this year. That said, the Bus Report testimonies seem to indicate that OCC holding control of funding has given it the upper hand in terms of decision making and overall governance, however as this CIA argues, improvements need to be done in the distribution of risks and rewards.

The Bus Report highlights that deciding to embark on a new delivery model should have as a departure point a clear case for change. From a climate change and broader sustainability perspective there is a case for change. As it will be discussed the changes required for addressing these problems based on the insights from the Bus Report will more likely be resolved through a franchising model, however given the good working relation between OCC and its operators and OCC's upper hand in controlling funds these changes may be accommodated in a EP+. Regardless of the decision of the delivery model, as this Annex will discuss, OCC should pursue a better distribution of risks and rewards, which are required for achieving the climate and broader sustainability targets highlighted in this document. Whilst now it is legally possible to change to alternative delivery models, given the existing good relation between OCC and bus operators, it is worth exploring what are the limitations of an EP+ model for achieving LTCP climate and broader sustainability targets, before bus

delivery models may be revisited as a result of Local Government Reorganisation and Devolution.

The case for change.

The Bus Report encourages for OCC officials to establish the case for change as the basis of deciding to what extent the existing delivery model is adequate for achieving OCC goals. In what follows we outline the case for change from a climate change and broader sustainability perspective.

Overarching issues:

1) **Transport emissions annual reduction rates need to significantly step up.**

   Oxfordshire's transport emissions are not declining at the rate required to achieve the LTCP target of achieving a net zero transport network by 2040 (see chart below). Oxfordshire transport emissions are the largest source of emissions in the county in 2023, with 90% being road transport (DESNZ, 2025). The LTCP estimated that in the UK in 2021, 55% of road transport corresponds to private car use and taxis.

   At current reduction rates, Oxfordshire transport emissions would get closer to net zero in 85 years (year 2110). Rather than current 1% annual reductions, Oxfordshire would require 14% annual reductions in transport emissions between now and 2040 to achieve its target. In this simple linear projection, it is not modelled yet how motorist may start reacting to the petrol car ban to take effect in 2035, yet analysts in academia have signalled that assumptions of electric vehicle uptake need to be balanced with the required contribution of car trip reductions (see argument below).



Figure 1. Oxfordshire Historical Transport Emissions with Local Authority influence and future projection scenarios. Source: Climate Action Team with DESNZ data[1][2]. DESNZ definition of “within influence of Local Authorities” includes A roads, minor roads and “other transport”, excluding motorways and railways emissions.

The responsibility for decarbonisation of road transport is shared by both central government and local authorities (LAs). Whilst central government has control of policies for transport decarbonisation such as ban on sales of fossil fuel vehicles and deployment of low carbon vehicle adoption incentives, LAs have influence in the adoption of public transport and the promotion of active travelling but are partially dependent on central government funding.

The Climate Change Commission (CCC), the central government climate change advisory body, has established a decarbonisation path in its Seventh Carbon Budget (2038-2042) for surface transport. This decarbonisation path relies on both the electrification of transport (under the control of central government) and modal shift away from private car use (under the influence of LAs). According to the Balanced Pathway, by the 7th carbon budget period (2038-2042), surface transport emissions will have to reduce by 86% relative to 2023. However, the distribution of contributions for the CCC decarbonisation path is heavily balanced towards transition to low carbon vehicles and less on modal shift. EVs are the main source of decarbonisation in passenger transport and abate 73% of all surface transport emissions by 2050, whereas 8% of decarbonisation achieved is related to modal shifts. The CCC transport decarbonisation path has been criticised in academia[3] as overtly reliant on electric vehicle deployment, since it would require achieving a 1.5 faster adoption than Norway, the world-leading country in EV rollout (Garvey et al. 2025[4]). Therefore, more needs to be done by LA’s to mitigate the potential failure of an expected unprecedented speed of electric vehicle adoption.

Oxfordshire County Council in its LTCP adopted a decarbonisation path called “Oxfordshire Leading the Way” that placed modal shift at the centre of its decarbonisation strategy. In the LTCP, OCC committed itself to reduce one in four car trips by 2040. The “one in four car trips” reduction target can be translated into a reduction of 25% in car vehicle mileage by 2030 in relation to 2022 (year of LTCP publication). Similarly, the second target of achieving “an additional 1 out 3 car trips in Oxfordshire” by 2040 can be translated into a 33% reduction in car mileage by 2040 in relation to 2030.

Using ONS national statistics of car and taxi mileage by local authority[5] we can apply the historical percentage that corresponds to what DESNZ regards as “within the influence of LA” (73%) and extrapolate the current trends on vehicle mileage (excluding the Covid lockdown years). Then we can estimate what is the level of mileage reduction required to achieve the LTCP car removal/replacement targets. The result is shown in the figure below.

[1] UK local authority and regional greenhouse gas emissions statistics, 2005 to 2023 - GOV.UK
[2] Decarbonising surface transport - POST
[3] Review of the CCC’s 7th Carbon Budget - Priestley Centre for Climate Futures
[4] Quoted in Review of the CCC’s 7th Carbon Budget - Priestley Centre for Climate Futures
[5] tra8902-miles-by-local-authority-and-selected-vehicle-type.ods



Figure 2. Extrapolation of Oxfordshire car mileage trends (blue line all transport, green line transport within influence of LA according to DESNZ) and required reductions in car trips (red line) to achieve Local Transport and Connectivity Plan targets in 2030 and 2040. Source: Climate Action with ONS and DESNZ

Whilst 2024 car & taxi mileage in Oxfordshire remains below pre-Covid levels, the current trend is potentially resuming the existing growth rate before the pandemic. **If this trend materialises it would represent a substantial deviation of the 5% average annual reduction rate in mileage required to achieve LTCP modal shift targets in 2040 (red line in figure above).**

Whilst bus transport is just one of multiple forms of removing/reducing car trips, its importance for OCC's social, environmental and climate targets has been highlighted in OCC's Local Transport and Connectivity Plan (policy 18). Bus travelling is a key component in Mobility Hubs which will facilitate the broader adoption of public transport facilitating car trip reduction and therefore carbon reductions. An analysis of how bus delivery models better integrate new transport infrastructure planning and bus planning is absent in the Bus report. Similarly important barriers for public transport adoption, particularly affordability have not been addressed in the Bus Report. These challenges are discussed in the following points.

2) **Bus affordability in Oxfordshire for young people** 6**.**

In the UK, young individuals without access to a car are more than twice as likely to have low mobility levels compared to their peers who are licensed drivers with cars (Chatterjee et al., 2019a). Additionally, young people from the lowest income households are more likely to experience low mobility (Collings et al., 2023). These

[6] This section and quotes are based on Research & Reports | Oxfordshire CRP and the report here: 088bb9_a7953c9f58794e8d8740a93aee65cd18.pdf

transport challenges contribute to broader issues of social and economic exclusion derived from limited access to education, employment, and social participation.

A recent survey (GOCRP, 2025) of accessibility and affordability of mobility conducted in Oxfordshire and Gloucestershire, highlighted that young people, particularly those in rural and semi-urban areas face significant and persistent barriers to accessing reliable, affordable and inclusive transport. **Affordability was the most frequently cited barrier.** This is not surprising as evidence suggests that in the UK the rising cost of public transport fares has outpaced wage growth, making travel increasingly unaffordable for young people. Since 2015, bus and coach fares have risen by 69%, while average wages increased by only 46% (Donkin et al., 2024)

Young people who co-created the GOCRP report developed proposals which aimed to shift responsibility from individual budgets to broader systemic pricing solutions:

- Group based discounts and multi-use passes
- Business Group ticket schemes (where employers bulk-buy rail passes via salary sacrifice)
- Flat-fee, multi-use travel pass valid across all regional forms of transport, designed to streamline access and reduce transport poverty.

One of the achievements of the existing Oxfordshire Bus Enhanced Partnership, is MyBus Oxfordshire, a ticket that allows one day or one-week unlimited travel on nearly all bus services across Oxfordshire, which offers a 46% discount to young people. Whilst bus operators have contributed in marketing the My Bus Scheme and set up the technical coordination to enable it, the MyBus ticket is not funded as a result of leveraging on private sector efficiencies, as would be expected of a public-private partnership, but through Department for Transport funding. Furthermore, many of the traffic efficiencies produced by OCC interventions such as those included in the Bus Service Improvement Delivery Plan are funded by central government. The value of these efficiencies is then retained by bus operators (e.g. fuel savings and others), without local authorities being capable of redirecting such value funded by central government in favour of poorer residents in the form of subsidised fares. The existing EP model only states that where operational savings are made because of public sector investment operators are expected to “use their best efforts” to ensure that these are reinvested in improvements to local bus services in Oxfordshire, rather than making bus fares more affordable. Furthermore, the expectation of reinvesting efficiencies in improvements is conditioned on “technical and commercial” feasibility.

The MyBus ticket almost complies with the recommendation of a young person flat-fee, multi-use travel pass valid across all regions, however it is limited to buses rather than all forms of transport. It is likely that a pass across all forms of transport will be more challenging to achieve on an enhanced partnership model given the need to establish routes and frequencies, synchronise timetables across modes and unified payment systems whilst avoiding different forms of transport to compete for passengers on same routes. As stated by the recent white paper on Mobility Hubs by England’s Economic Heartland[7], bus franchising offers a valuable opportunity for

[7] *Mobility Hubs: White Paper

whole systems planning (p.7). Integrated multi-modal transport also is crucial in the context of developing new roads, which is part of OCC's responsibility as highways authority. As discussed in the following point, in the pursuit of integrated transport networks there is a need for coordinated bus routes on both existing and new road developments.

Better coordinated planning between Bus Partnership and OCC Transport Infrastructure Planning.

The Local Transport and Connectivity Plan commits to "seek to make the bus a natural first choice through development of infrastructure" (policy 18c) and the BSIP has a goal to "keep buses at the heart of decision making". Similarly, the LTCP policy 18e establishes that OCC will ensure that all new strategic development is designed for bus access and provides suitable funding for high quality services and infrastructure.

Policy 18 of the Local Transport and Connectivity Plan which commits to "seek to make the bus a natural first choice through development of infrastructure". As a highways authority, OCC is responsible for the development of new roads and the integration of public transport and active travel modes. In the absence of public transport, every new road runs the risk of increasing traffic. Therefore, the lack of a close integration of new road and bus planning can potentially entrench the dependency on cars and therefore result in increased emissions. Under the existing EP bus delivery model, it is the bus operator that decides where a new bus route should run based on commercial feasibility rather than social need. New routes in new roads probably represent a risk for new operators since there is no previous commuter data that can be used to build a business case for a new bus route. It is often the case that new roads are in rural areas where commercial feasibility is often lower. In a franchising delivery model the LA that decides where a bus route needs to run, rather than decided by operators based on route profitability. Since a franchising delivery model can cross subsidise routes, a LA has the capacity to make integrated planning of new roads including bus routes in routes that may not be commercially viable in isolation. It is not clear at this point to what extent the proposed EP+ model can support integrated transport planning of new roads and bus routes, since the decision of opening a bus route in a deregulated market is decided by a bus operator based on commercial viability, rather than social and/or environmental needs. In the negotiations for an EP+, OCC officers should aim to test the limits of the delivery model to pursue an integrated transport planning, which may entail a different distribution of risks between LA and bus operators, but not at the level of risk distribution as in the case of a franchising model. Bus operators have expressed openness for LA's to be exposed to further revenue risks (and should therefore include the associated reward), such is the case of a better coordination of infrastructure works and traffic filters.

An area of opportunity in an EP+ delivery model is sharing of detailed patronage data between OCC and bus operators. At the moment patronage data sharing is limited. An EP+ delivery model should aim to share patronage data for a better integrated transport planning, which at the end will benefit both parties.

The Bus Report states highlights the lack of planning integration in the Traffic Filter Scheme with bus operations. The scheme was put on hold following the closure of Botley Road by Network Rail. However other traffic management schemes (20 mph

zones and low traffic neighbourhoods) were still introduced with poor engagement with operators (according to them) resulting in the slower bus traffic, journey time increasing and journeys becoming more unreliable (Bus Report, p. 15). According to bus operators this a result of an inadequate distribution of risks across the public and private actors that integrate the bus partnership as will be discussed below.

Inadequate distribution of risk and rewards in enhanced partnership.

As discussed at the beginning, resourcing to the private sector is based on the preconception that it is willing to accept risks in bus operations in exchange of retaining the rewards. Public-private partnerships such as the existing bus partnership between OCC and bus operators are meant to deliver access to private sector capital, enhanced efficiency, innovation, risk sharing, improved service quality and long-term value for money.

Nevertheless, under the existing EP model, it is the public sector that is mitigating the risks in the bus operation and allowing the private sector to retain most of the rewards. Some relevant cases of this misaligned distribution of risk-reward are discussed below.

a) **Innovation risk substantially mitigated by central government:** the risk of electrifying bus fleets was substantially mitigated by central government funding through the Zero Emission Bus Regional Areas scheme (ZEBRA) program. The funding was focused on supporting closing the gap in the cost between electric and diesel buses, where bus operators could claim up to 75% of the cost difference. Therefore, whilst operators have invested in vehicles and charging infrastructure, the bus operators' level of investment (and associated financial risk) was substantially mitigated through the ZEBRA funding. Whilst government support is not a negative intervention per se, it contradicts the traditional conception of private sector actors as risk taking and innovative. More innovation funded by the private sector should be expected in an EP+ partnership.

b) **De facto monopolies in dedicated routes:** the partnership achieved the avoidance of duplication of bus operators in the same route, in this way rationalising the vehicle use, making more efficient use of each vehicle in the fleet, improving traffic and potentially increasing patronage. This is highly desirable from an efficiency perspective, however, by doing this competition is prevented between operators on the same route that would, according to neoclassical economic theory, have likely produce price reductions. Local authorities like OCC were motivated to do this aiming to address some negative features of the market, highlighted in the National Bus Strategy, such as rival networks that do not acknowledge each other's existence, and which use the same route numbers for wholly different services, using different tickets and without timetable coordination. However, whilst aiming to address these issues,, the result was providing a de facto monopoly to bus operators in specific routes. A franchising model would also allocate de facto monopolies to each bus operator in dedicated routes, but the crucial difference is that it would allocate such route after the successful bid of a competitive tender process which would potentially drive fares down among other benefits for residents. Such competitive tender process would produce the market competition that

could deliver better value for money for Oxfordshire residents. Furthermore, the profits levels of such dedicated route would be controlled by the local authority in a franchising model rather than automatically retained by the bus operator through direct contract uncompetitive allocation as it seems to be happening in the existing model. See section *the role of competition in franchising* in CMA(2024)[8].

It seems that Oxfordshire is funding rural alternative bus services outside of the partnership. In deciding on a different delivery model it should be considered that Oxfordshire is already subsidising non-commercially attractive bus routes.

c) **Value of public funded efficiencies not directed to tackling affordability challenge:** The de facto monopoly routes granted to bus operators without competition become more valuable when public funds are used to improve traffic and give preference to buses. An example of this are traffic filters which would in turn benefit the bus operator. Whilst bus operators have agreed to implement several service enhancements and new services once the traffic filters are implemented, there does not seem to be any proposal in the table to reduce fare prices as a form of value shared with residents. This environment then becomes a mostly risk-free situation for the bus operator where efficiencies are mainly funded by government funds without any sharing of resulting efficiencies which could be translated into tackling the affordability challenge that may increase bus adoption across Oxfordshire.

d) **Revenue risk shared with Local Authorities not balanced with rewards.** Local bus operators have complained about the delay in implementing traffic filters, arguing that if the Local Authority would be exposed to revenue risk they would have accelerated their implementation. They argue the existing partnership does not provide incentive, in the form of revenue risk, upon the Local Authority to plan transport works in a way to minimise any obstruction of the efficient operation of buses. Whilst there is no current revenue risk agreement, despite delays such as Botley Road being out of the control of LAs (under Network Rail control), authorities like OCC are compelled to compensate bus operators using BSIP funding, which is meant to be used to improve efficiency. Such arrangements make LA's like OCC part of de facto revenue risk sharing, as those existing in franchising delivery models, without having corresponding rewards once transit efficiencies are achieved.

The Bus Report rightly states that "The current barriers to bus service improvements lie beyond the remit of the Oxfordshire Bus Enhanced Partnership. Increasing bus journey times and poor reliability and punctuality are down to growing traffic congestion, roadworks and road closure". In relation to this, bus operators suggest there should be a greater involvement and buy-in from OCC's Highways Team, given the important issues of bus priority measures, traffic management, tree trimming, roadworks and road closures that impact bus operation. This CIA agrees with greater involvement of bus

[8] Bus franchising - CMA advice for Local Transport Authorities

operation with OCC's teams, including not only maintenance but broader transport planning and transport infrastructure delivery teams with the aim of integrated transport planning. However rather than arguing for a fairer redistribution of risks and rewards in the partnership in favour of lower prices for residents, the Bus Report states that the solution is in continuing to extract resources to fix them from public funds and residents: "ultimately, other strategies will be needed to encourage mode shift from car to bus. Some of these measures might also help provide funds to continue enhancing the bus network…include more stringent parking policies and higher parking charges, workplace parking levy and road pricing. Further bus priority measures may also help."

Conclusions: Daring to do it differently?

7. The commissioned Bus Report and the Cabinet Recommendation resulting from it, do not focus on assessing how the proposed EP+ delivery model would contribute to achieve the climate and broader sustainability targets established in the Local Transport and Connectivity Plan (LTCP). This CIA has outlined the case for change, highlighting that current transport carbon emissions trends are deviating from LTCP targets. Rather than prescribing a particular bus delivery model, this CIA focuses on areas of improvement in the existing EP bus delivery model, that should be addressed in any future bus delivery models. In doing so this CIA highlights uneven distribution of risk and rewards in the existing EP model, that are likely hindering the achievement of LTCP climate targets. The EP+ proposed model seems to be an incremental change from the existing EP bus delivery model. Whether the EP+ proposal can address the areas of improvement and better distribution of risks and rewards highlighted in this CIA, depends on the feasibility of reaching the required agreements with bus operators within such framework.

As the Bus Reports makes it clear, the success of the existing enhanced partnership has largely **relied on the availability of public funding to derisk bus operations** in areas of low carbon innovation, efficiency and subsidising for affordability.

As this climate and broader sustainability assessment has analysed these **benefits are not set to arise from the efficiencies that should result from market competition in a deregulated environment**, but from the continuous flow of public funding. Publicly funded efficiencies have not yet materialised due to congestion issues derived from issues out of the control of OCC (Botley Road railway works) and yet OCC has had to compensate bus operators as if a revenue risk agreement (such as those characteristic of franchising arrangements) was in place.

Following **the existing model will very likely result in a severe delay in the target of achieving a net zero transport network in Oxfordshire by 2040 and enabling targets in LTCP such as replacing ¼ of car trips by 2030 and**

a further 1/3 of car trips in 2040. See extrapolation of business as usual below.



Figure 1. Oxfordshire Local Transport Emissions with extrapolations to net zero under two scenarios business as Usual (blue) and the required path for achieving Net Zero by 2040 as targeted in Oxfordshire's Local Transport and Connectivity Plan. Source: OCC Climate Action team with DESNZ data.



Figure 2. Extrapolation of Oxfordshire car mileage trends (blue line all transport, red line transport within influence of LA according to DESNZ) and required reductions in car trips (red line) to achieve Local Transport and Connectivity Plan targets in 2030 and 2040. Source: Climate Action with ONS and DESNZ

In the pursuit of bus route efficiencies and simplification of bus operations for residents, the existing partnership has achieved avoiding the duplication of bus

operators in routes, however in doing so it has **produced de facto monopolies in every route which are not allocated through competitive tender processes, as would be the case in a franchise model**. Furthermore, the **value of efficiencies that will be achieved through public funding, under the current arrangements are to be retained by bus operators.** Whilst operators have committed to reinvest part of the value retained in further improvements, **there is no plan to direct that value to tackle the affordability challenge in the form of lower fares to residents.** Lower fares may increase bus uptake and therefore bus operators revenue, therefore testing such affordability options should be also in favour of bus operators. It is the younger residents that are mostly impacted by lack of affordability in public transport as detailed by the GOCRP report quoted in this assessment.

The EP+ model will enhance OCC capabilities for engaging in alternative models in the future (access to detailed route patronage data and stronger involvement of Highways Team within EP), however it is not clear how the EP+ model will address the unfair distribution of risks and rewards in the partnership which are highlighted in Annex 3 CIA namely: innovation risk substantially mitigated by central government, de facto monopolies in dedicated routes, Value of public funded efficiencies not directed to tackling affordability challenge**,** revenue risk shared with Local Authorities not balanced with rewards.

Given the existing good relation between OCC and bus operators, it is worth testing the limits of such EP+ proposal to address the issues highlighted in this CIA, in the interim period before the bus delivery model may be revisited again as a result of Local Government Reorganisation and Devolution. As part of supporting LAs decision to engage in alternative bus delivery models, best practices on EP+ models will be published by government later in the year and should be considered in the negotiation process.

Detailed CIA Scoring



Category	Impact criteria	Score (-3 to +3)	Description of impact	Actions or mitigations to reduce negative impacts	Action owner	Timeline and monitoring arrangements
Energy	Increases energy efficiency	N/A	Potential for positive impacts but this is not assumed.			
Energy	Promotes a switch to low-carbon or renewable energy	N/A	Potential for positive impacts but this is not assumed.			
Energy	Promotes resilient, local, smart energy systems	N/A	Potential for positive impacts but this is not assumed.			
Transport & Connectivity	Reduces need to travel and/or the need for private car ownership	-1	Not clear yet how EP+ will address existing car mileage trends in Oxfordshire (see Annex 3).	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Transport & Connectivity	Supports active travel	1	Research shows that individuals who use public transport benefit from increased physical activity over those who don't, by walking to stops and final destinations.	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Transport & Connectivity	Increases use of public transport	-2	Not clear how the EP+ will address affordability which remains one of the main barriers for adoption of public transport (see Annex 3).	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Transport & Connectivity	Accelerates electrification of transport	-2	Not clear how the EP+ will address the high dependence of public funding for low carbon innovation, rather than innovation resulting from market competition (see Annex 3). The electrification of bus fleets remains			
Buildings	Promotes net zero new builds and developments	N/A	No or very limited impact			
Buildings	Accelerates retrofitting of existing buildings	3	Partnership has achieved so far bus operators to invest in charging infrastructure in depots.			
Nature	Protects, restores or enhances biodiversity, landscape and ecosystems	-1	New bus lanes for example could have the potential to encroach on grass verges and hedgerows but this would be considered in working up the details of such as scheme and is thought to be fairly minimal.	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Nature	Develops blue and green infrastructure	N/A	Potential for positive impacts but this is not assumed.			
Nature	Improves access to nature and green spaces	1	Improves routes and access to green spaces in a sustainable and more equitable way	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Waste & Consumption	Reduces overall consumption	N/A	No or very limited impact			
Waste & Consumption	Supports waste prevention and drive reuse and recycling	N/A	No or very limited impact			
Resilience & Adaptation	Increases resilience to flooding	N/A	No or very limited impact			
Resilience & Adaptation	Increases resilience to other extreme weather events (e.g., storms, cold snaps, heatwaves, droughts)	N/A	No or very limited impact			
Resilience & Adaptation	Increases resilience of council services, communities, energy systems, transport infrastructure and/or supply chains	1	Increased bus route provision and frequency of service could result in providing greater resilience of council services	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Procurement & Investment	Procurement practices prioritise low-carbon options, circular economy and sustainability	-3	EP lack of competitive bidding processes for allocating de facto route monopolies (see Annex 3). Not clear how EP+ will address this.			
Procurement & Investment	Investment being considered supports climate action/ is consistent with path to net zero	-2	In EP, central government has provided 75% of cost gap of electric buses in relation to diesel bus fleet. Whilst operators have invested in charging infrastructure, the largest capital investment is in electric bus fleets, as a result the bus operators'			
People & Organizations	Drives behavioural change to address the climate and ecological emergency	1	The central aims of the proposals are to grow bus patronage and the bus network and in doing so supports and encourages behaviour change. But the potential is limited if affordability is not addressed.	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
People & Organizations	Drives organizational and systemic change to address the climate and ecological emergency	-2	The EP+ proposal is an incremental change to the existing EP model. There is a risk that EP+ limitations may not cater for the required systemic change required to achieve LTCP target of 2040 net zero transport	The limitations of the EP+ model after negotiations with bus operators may be analysed again as part of Local Government Reorganisation and Devolution.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Just transition	Promotes green innovation and job creation	N/A	Potential for positive impacts but this is not assumed.			
Just transition	Promotes health and wellbeing	2	There are numerous health benefits for bus users and residents for example, increased physical activity, reduced congestion and improved air quality.	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Just transition	Reduces poverty and inequality	-2	Not clear how EP+ will address affordability issues.	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.
Just transition	Promotes inclusion and participation	-2	Residents, local groups and stakeholders engaged in proposal development. However the views of younger residents need to be addressed (see Annex 3).	This will be considered when developing the details of the EP+ proposal.	Katharine Broomfield	As and when EP+ proposal details are developed.